Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands

ABSTRACT

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is halfway through a multi-decade modernization process. It has begun a major restructuring effort as it shifts its focus from a traditional continental defensive posture to a more maritime-oriented emphasis. In order to create more balanced joint force, it has adjusted the structure of its highest command organization, the Central Military Commission; abolished the former four General Departments and seven Military Regions; created five new joint Theater Commands and service-level commands for the Army and Rocket Force; and is reducing the size of its active duty force by 300,000 personnel. While seeking to overcome numerous internal obstacles, the PLA continues to develop and improve its capabilities to conduct integrated joint operations to deter a variety of threats to China’s sovereignty and territory and, if deterrence fails, to win informationized local war.     

Building Legitimacy: Interactional Dynamics and the Popular Evaluation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey

Abstract

Previous research has identified a variety of general mechanisms to explain how insurgents build legitimacy. Yet, there is often a gap between these mechanisms and the interactional dynamics of insurgencies. This article attempts to bridge this gap through a theoretically informed analysis of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) insurgency in Turkey. I show how the PKK’s efforts to cultivate legitimacy, Turkey’s counterinsurgency strategies, and civilian perceptions of the PKK, all mutually influenced one another. Based on this analysis, I argue that the mechanisms that produce popular legitimacy coevolve with insurgents’ behaviors, states’ interventions, and civilians’ perceptions.     

‘A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations’

A key organizational challenge for all modern militaries is instituting an effective command-and-control (C2) structure for joint operations. China has been a relative latecomer to joint operations, with a persistent weakness in joint C2. Reforms launched in early 2016 sought to overcome this challenge by establishing a permanent two-level joint C2 structure. Although not a ‘tipping point’ that will lead ineluctably to stronger operational effectiveness, this reform is nonetheless an important milestone in an evolutionary process towards better PLA joint operations. The result could be added operational challenges for several of China’s neighbors and the United States.     

Quarrelsome committees in US defense acquisition: the KC-X case

When the US Air Force set out to acquire a new aerial tanker (the KC-X), two highly suitable alternatives were offered. What could have been a short and simple source selection turned into a prolonged embarrassment. The original selection of 100 leased KC-767s was made in May 2003. But the KC-46 is expected to be operational in 2017 – more than a decade later. Our primary purpose here is to narrate and explain key events in the KC-X program. We search for useful paradigms, based in part on the US Government being better viewed as a quarrelsome committee than a monopsonist. In addition, we consider what this case might tell us about the US defense acquisition system.     

建筑太阳能光电热一体化系统的瞬态性能模拟

利用TRNSYS软件对重庆夏季建筑屋顶太阳能光电热一体化系统进行瞬态模拟分析计算,得到系统瞬时发电量与一段时间内累计发电量,光电热模块瞬时进出水温度与太阳能平板集热器瞬时进出水温度,系统一段时间内光电热模块累计有效得热量与一段时间内太阳能平板集热器累计有效得热量,系统的光电转换效率、光热转换效率以及太阳能综合利用效率。结果表明,建筑屋顶太阳能光电热一体化系统是重庆地区建筑太阳能光电热一体化系统适宜的型式。     

变距离静电电位检测研究

针对现有非接触式静电检测装置存在检测距离近且距离固定等问题,提出了对电位测量进行距离补偿的变距离静电电位检测方案。首先,从电位测量的基本原理出发,分析了距离测量误差与电位测量误差的关系,验证了精确测距的重要性,即要满足电位测量相对误差σV≤±10%,所选测距方式的距离测量相对误差-4.65%≤σd0≤5.41%的技术指标。然后,通过实验研究了检测距离与感应电位的关系,验证了0.5 m内对静电电位变距离测量的可行性,得到了对电位测量进行距离补偿的公式雏形Vs(V a,d)=Va(a+bd)c。依据此公式雏形以及大量的重复实验,可以得到公式中的各项参数值,编入单片机可实现对静电电位的变距离检测。     

The Pitfalls of Cross-National Comparison in Conflict Research

Professor Joseph Soeters shows admirable ambition in comparing national styles of conflict resolution and is extremely eager to draw historical lessons from such comparative exercises. However, he gets entangled in national mythmaking as he underestimates the complexity of comparative history of this kind. Particularly the establishment of true causal links between national (strategic) cultures and actual tactical behaviour on the ground is far more difficult than he suggests in his recent book chapter and his reply to my article in this journal.     

‘Clean’ bombs: Nuclear technology and nuclear strategy in the 1950s

The idea of ‘clean’ bombs, nuclear weapons with a reduced amount of radioactive fallout resulting from their fission part, has met much ridicule since its public inauguration in 1956. Many scholars have regarded the bombs as a propaganda tool, stopping short of analyzing their role in the transformative phase of US nuclear strategy in the 1950s. This paper reexamines the clean bomb episode through 1958, shedding light upon the dynamic relationship between the development of nuclear weapons technology and the evolution of nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response. It also discusses the mechanism and momentum of nuclear weapons technology innovation until the US suspended nuclear testing in late 1958.     

ICAO二阶阶跃畸变模型下的SAIM接收机测距精度分析

测距精度是评估卫星自主完好性监测（SAIM）接收机在导航信号畸变环境下工作性能的一个重要指标,论文从数学上推导出了SAIM接收机在国际民航组织（ICAO）二阶阶跃畸变模型下采用早晚相干跟踪处理时测距精度与畸变模型参数的解析表达式,理论分析和仿真结果表明数字畸变将导致接收机伪码鉴相器输出曲线存在过零点偏差,数字畸变量基本不影响接收机测距方差;模拟畸变将扭曲相关峰函数和鉴相器输出曲线,但鉴相器输出基本上不存在过零点偏差,模拟畸变参数、前端滤波器带宽和早晚码间距共同影响接收机的测距方差。     

‘Full spectrum dominance’: Donald Rumsfeld,the Department of Defense,and US irregular warfare strategy, 2001–2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake.